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I. INTRODUCTION
In many countries, the …rst democratic elections take place at a time when violent con ‡icts between various political groups are not completely settled. Paramilitary groups are often not entirely disarmed. Death squads may still be active, with the o¢cial army undergoing reorganization or restructuring. This overlap between peace negotiations and con ‡ict settlement on the one hand, and electoral competition on the other, may critically a¤ect the nature of the institutions chosen during the of transition to democracy (Shugart, 1992, Wantchekon and Ellman, 1997) . This paper discusses how uncertainty over the implementation of the peace accords and the survival of the political process itself a¤ected the outcome of the 1994 elections in El Salvador.
El Salvador is the smallest of the Central American countries (21,393 square kilometers), with the highest population density (approximately 262 persons per square kilometer) and a per capita income of $1,610 with purchasing power parity of $2,000 in 1995 (World Bank, 1997 and Rafael Menjívar Larín and Fabrizio Feliciani, 1995) .
El Salvador has a long-standing pattern of unequal resource distribution. According to Montgomery (1995) , this pattern endured both as economic power was consolidated by the oligarchy under Spanish colonial rule, then later as the army gained political power after independence. Between independence in 1841 and 1960, El Salvador experienced relative political stability, with the use of repression after 1932 (Montgomery, 1995) With the coup of 1960 came a period in which international as well as domestic forces would lead to the polarization of the political arena. (Montgomery, 1995 and Woodward, 1985) . The reformist center-left National Conciliation Party (PCN) was elected to power in 1962 in , 1967 in , 1972 in and 1977 in (Eguizábal, 1992 . However, when the PCN resorted to electoral fraud to keep control of the National Assembly from the leftist National Opposition Union in 1972, announcement of the PCN victory prompted leftists to make an (unsuccessful) coup attempt (Webre, 1979) . Massive irregularities in the 1977 elections encouraged the left to organize further. At the same time, struggle within the armed forces and disagreement among the oligarchy led reactionary factions of each to collaborate in a 1979 military take-over that brought the country to the brink of anarchy (Eguizábal, 1992 and Montgomery, 1995) .
In 1980 a coalition of 18 leftist and far leftist groups formed the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) and later the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the military a¢liate of the FDR. A civil war broke out between government forces and the FMLN. After a decade of con ‡ict, both sides agreed to peace talks under the supervision of the United Nations. These talks led to the end of the war in 1992. The settlement included the following terms: (1) the disbanding of rebel forces incrementally over a 9 month period; (2) the government purchase of land for redistribution in rural areas; (3) the purging of the government o¢cers' corps; (4) the absorption into the regular army of the National guards and the treasury police;
and (5) the dissolution of the military intelligence and civil defense units; and (6) the creation of new police forces (Montgomery, 1995) .
Concerning the issue of land reform, according to , the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) government committed itself to transferring 245 hectares to the landless. In the zones of former con ‡ict, ownership was supposed to be transferred to current occupants of the land, and the government was to compensate the former owners. However, at the time of the elections in 1994, the actual transfer of land was incomplete. The initial inventory of land submitted by the FMLN listed some 12,000 parcels. After 6 months of negotiations, this demand was scaled down to 4,600 parcels, comprising only 16% of the arable land (United Nations, 1992) . By January 1994 only 8% of the proposed land had been transferred, due to the reluctance on the part of the landowners to sell, bureaucratic ine¢cien-cies, and peasants' concerns about assuming large debts on commercially valued land (Montgomery, 1995) .
A 1988 survey showed that poverty and disparity in land distribution were among the main reasons for the civil war (IUDOP, 1988) . Despite a land reform program initiated under the Christian Democrat government, 51% of the peasant population had no land in 1986 and 2.9% of the landowners held 46% of the land (Durham, 1995) . In 1985 a World Bank report found that the poorest 40% of the population earned 10.9% of total personal income while the richest 10% earned 36.4% of all income.(Word Bank, 1997) The situation was even worse in rural areas: 96% of the population did not earn enough to cover basic needs (estimated at $126 per month), while the richest 1% earned $1,078 per month (Montgomery, 1995) At the same time, as Seligson (1995) points out, these conditions were coupled with extreme repression which, together, brought about the war (p. 44).
The …rst post-civil war presidential and legislative elections took place in March 1994. In the presidential election, the two major candidates were Ruben Zamora of Democratic Convergence (FMLN-MNR-DC), a left-wing coalition which includes the FMLN, and Armando Calderón Sol of ARENA, a right-wing party. In the …rst round, ARENA won 49.03% of the vote, the FMLN-MNR-DC won 24%, and the centrist Christian Democratic party (PDC) won 16.4% (Vickers and Spence, 1994) . Since no party won a majority, a run-o¤ election was held between Calderón Sol and Zamora, which the former won by 68% to 32% of the vote. ARENA's victory subsequently led to pessimism over the prospects for democratic consolidation in El Salvador. As Vickers and Spence (1995) note, "the results pose very serious questions for those who hoped to consolidate the peace process through elections. What happened instead is a consolidation of power by the right and hastened fragmentation of the left. The center has collapsed, and Salvadoran society remains as polarized as before"(p. 11). This paper presents a game theoretic model to explain the broad support for ARENA among those who voted in the 1994 elections in El Salvador. We analyze the critical role played by the overlapping dynamics of peace negotiations and discuss the implications of our …ndings for the prospects of democratic consolidation in the country. The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 1 discusses the electoral outcome and entertains possible explanations for it. With data provided by public opinion polls taken from 1988 to 1994, Section 2 argues that uncertainty over the peace process was the most critical factor in deciding the electoral outcome. Sections 3 and 4 present a game theoretic model that explains the mechanism whereby fear of a collapse of the democratic process led to the election of Calderón Sol. The model helps elucidate the central features of the political campaign and the election, including why ARENA played the "fear card" and why the peasants, despite being the main bene…ciaries of land reform, voted in great numbers for a party that was trying to limit the scope of this reform (Seligson and Booth, 1995) . Section 5 explains why the FMLN-MNR-DC favored deal making between parties rather than popular mobilization as its electoral strategy. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME
The origins of the civil war in El Salvador lie at least in part in the widespread poverty and unequal land distribution in rural areas. On these issues, ARENA has always located itself squarely on the side of the rich landowners. These conditions, together with abusive military treatment and killings carried out by death squads, resulted in popular support for the war in rural areas. Again, ARENA was not on the popular side of the con ‡ict. Instead, it was backed by the military establishment and was involved in notorious terrorist activities. Polls taken in August 1993 showed that 62.9% of the electorate viewed ARENA as a right-wing party and 65.6 % saw the party as being backed by the military (IUDOP, 1993) This electoral outcome is relatively unique and di¤ers from a number of other experiences with democratization in Africa (e.g. Benin, South Africa) as well as Latin America (Chile, Equador, Nicaragua). 1 In these cases, social democrats or centrist but not right-wing candidates have won the …rst elections after a peace agreement has been reached.
The central puzzle of the 1994 Salvadoran election is thus the support of rural poor voters for ARENA, despite the fact that 90% of the electorate considered it to be controlled by rich landlords. It is particularly puzzling since rural voters were not forced to choose one candidate over another. If they were afraid to show their support for the left, they could have chosen to not to vote at all, spoil their ballots, or support the Christian Democrats as they had done in 1981 and 1984. But instead, they chose to help elect ARENA. Analysts have provided a variety of explanations for the behavior of the Salvadoran electorate, largely pointing to the signi…cant structural problems and procedural irregularities that compromised democratic participation (Seligson and Booth, 1995; Vickers and Spence, 1994; . Extensive poll data compiled by the Central American University (UCA) in San Salvador from 1988 to 1994 shed further light on the issues of the conduct of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, media coverage, and voter abstention. 2 As Vickers and Spence (1994) and show, the electoral process was ‡awed by a number of procedural problems, including defects in voter registration and the unfair distribution of state campaign funds. According to , 74,000 applications for voter registration cards were rejected, and 35,000 issued cards were never picked up, mostly for logistical reasons. The following table shows the distribution of registration cards according to between the ARENA and the FMLN supporters.
Insert Figure 1 here Given the dubious legacy of the partisan Central Elections Council, a carry-over from the 1980s until after the peace accords were signed, the 1991 constitutional reforms and 1993 electoral code stipulated the creation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) as an independent body. However, as Montgomery (1995) and others suggest, the TSE was not always impartial. Accusations of incompetence and fraud seriously challenged o¢cial claims of transparency of the electoral process, particularly given the historical context in which they arose (Baloyra, 1982) .
With respect to the allocation of public campaign subsidies, ARENA was given 54% of campaign funds compared to 31% for the PDC and 7% for the FMLN-MNR-DC (Stahler-Sholk, 1994, p. 24) However, this unfair allocation was likely most damaging to the FMLN-MNR-DC not in presidential but local races where there were fairly narrow margins of ARENA victory for seats in areas thought to be FMLN strongholds. Furthermore, to the extent that the FMLN-MNR-DC seemed not to be entirely committed to winning at the presidential level, the campaign …nance inequity issue is less compelling. We …nd reason to question the FMLN's commitment in the presidential campaign since the key party leader of the FMLN-MNR-DC, or the coalition of the People Expression of Renewal (ERP), declared that "winning could be harmful for the country's stability" (Vickers and Spence, 1994, p. 10) . We should also note that the PDC won fewer votes than the FMLN-MNR-DC (16% to 24%) despite having been allocated a share of campaign funds more than four times higher. As explained below, the disproportionate distribution of campaign funds were instrumental in ARENA's victory because it gave this party more resources to play the fear card through television ads. Although ARENA would have won on the fear factor without the funding advantage, having more funds enhanced ARENA's ability to frighten voters.
Another possible explanation for the electoral outcome concerns divisions within the left. There was disagreement among the left over the choice of the presidential candidate and also over the platform of the coalition. The ERP leaned towards a centrist platform, and the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) wanted to develop a clear leftist political identity. However, this type of discord also a¤ected ARENA, especially at the beginning of the political campaign (Vickers and Spence, 1994, p. 10). We have seen no evidence that these internal party con ‡icts a¤ected the public perception of the candidates' abilities to run the country.
The data on voter turnout also support an argument based on voter apathy resulting from situational factors such as a lack of trust in the electoral authorities and process (IUDOP, 1994) . Forty-…ve percent of the electorate reportedly did not vote in the presidential election (IUDOP, 1994) . In our view, the lack of trust Seligson and Córdova (1995) …nd was exacerbated by the high costs of voting. According to Barajas (1994) polling booths "were few and far between and were organized by voters' last names. Voting required not only long trips and even longer waits, but generated enormous confusion as crowds of voters struggled to …nd the proper table at which to cast their ballots. Many polling places were not set up in any recognizable order:
A's followed by M's followed by J's etc..." (p. 1). Considering that Conroy et al. (in Seligson and Booth, 1995) …nd the primary predictor of turnout beyond registration status to be socioeconomic status, it would then follow that rural FMLN-MNR-DC supporters would turn out at disproportionately lower rates-as mediated by the high costs of voting and the related voter distrust.
Evidence on distribution of abstainers might help measure how much this low turnout favored ARENA. However, even with the voting costs of ballot box irregularities and the related disinterest in voting, it is not clear that this favored ARENA signi…cantly more than it did the FMLN-MNR-DC. Therefore, it may explain low voter turnout, but not the massive vote for ARENA. In fact, the electoral outcome simply con…rmed the trends already observed in the public opinion polls: since 1985, ARENA had become the dominant party in the country. This party had already supplanted the Christian Democrats and the FMLN-MNR-DC in the polls. 3 From this perspective, the question at hand then moves from explaining low voter turnout to accounting for why those who voted in 1994 tended to support ARENA. This is not to deny the importance of the factors discussed above, or the substantial implications of low participation. But if participation had been high, it remains likely that ARENA would have nevertheless won the 1994 presidential election. 4 Therefore, we will turn to the issue of why those who did vote supported ARENA.
In our view, threats of post-electoral violence and uncertainty over the implementation of the peace accords were the deciding factors in the 1994 electoral outcome. 5 Even if the fundamental cause of the war was poverty, ending the war itself increasingly became the salient issue in the minds of voters. This is supported by the following polls taken in November-December 1988.
Insert Figure 2 here
Peasants were preoccupied by violence and voted for the party they perceived would most likely guarantee stability. As a result, the militarily strong ARENA won in the rural areas. In February 1994, one month before the elections, 28% of rural voters were leaning towards the ARENA as opposed to 10% for the FMLN and 12% for the PDC (Spence and Vickers, 1994) . Polls taken …ve years earlier in December 1988 showed that only 20.7% of rural voters were then favorable to ARENA as opposed to 19% for the PDC (IUDOP, 1994) . From 1989 to 1993, the proportion of the electorate placing law and order at the top of their agenda dropped from 58% to 31%. However, this proportion remained high enough for us to claim that the war and law and order were the most important issues in El Salvador in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 6 These polls show that rural voters, which constitute a majority of the electorate, clearly placed threats of political violence and law and order above land reform when casting their ballots in the 1994 presidential election.
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The theory developed in the next section is consistent with the observed outcome of the 1994 presidential election. This theory is valid whether or not the outcome of the election is due to low turnout. If there were empirical evidence showing that most abstainers were FMLN-MNR-CDC supporters, then the model could be used to explain the mechanism leading to such a situation. If low turnout were not a factor, the model could explain why those who voted chose ARENA.
In the model, parties hold divergent positions on the issue of land reform. There is also a minimum or a maximum level of reform beyond which either party will abstain from the peace accords. We show that when the costs (to parties) of a breakdown of the peace accords are moderate, and if law and order is more likely to be secured under an ARENA government, then voters will favor ARENA. In anticipation of this outcome, the FMLN-MNR-DC will have an incentive not to run competitively (in the presidential election), but instead to favor deal making on key issues such as state building and land reform. We argue that uncertainty over the peace accords provided a structural advantage for the right in the 1994 elections. Thus, we support arguments based on direct intimidation of voters to the extent that such intimidation is seen as part of a broader strategy of the ARENA to convince voters that an FMLN-MNR-DC's victory could lead to political instability. Based on the evidence, we anticipate that in future elections, voters' attention will switch from concerns over political order to issues such as education or the alleviation of poverty. This development, we argue, should improve the competitiveness of the political process. 
III. THE MODEL
We present a simple game theoretic model to investigate how uncertainty over the peace accords in El Salvador could have a¤ected voting behavior in the 1994 elections.
To make the analysis transparent, we restrict the political environment to the leftist coalition represented by the FMLN-MNR-DC and the rightist party of ARENA. We assume that these two parties compete in a one-dimensional policy space for votes from a …nite set of N voters. This policy issue is agrarian reform. We pick this issue because it is the most complex, the most polarizing, and clearly the most critical issue in the rural areas. As acknowledged by Stahl-Sholk (1995) and others, it was also one of the main substantive components of the peace accords over which there was still much uncertainty at the time of the election. We further assume that each party has both a political wing, which de…nes its policy platform, and a military wing Voters are assumed to be policy-oriented and to care particularly about the issue of land reform. Based on the demographic structure of El Salvador, and on the fact that peasants had consistently and unequivocally favored comprehensive land reform, IUDOP, 1988 IUDOP, , p. 1075 it is safe to conclude that the median voter in Salvadoran rural areas is a landless or near-landless peasant who is in favor of land reform. We denote this voter by M and assume that this voter is the pivotal and the only relevant voter in the election.
Winning the election gives the victor the prerogative to implement a policy. We de…ne by y L the level of reform initiated if L wins and y R the level of reform if R wins. Depending on this policy outcome, the loser, say R, decides whether or not to break with the peace agreement. A break in the peace agreement is costly and this cost is ¡c L for the FMLN-DC-MNR, ¡c R for the ARENA and ¡c M for the median voter M: We de…ne by p R the probability that the peace agreement breaks down if R loses the election.
Timeline and Payo¤s
The game starts when voters observe parties' policy characteristics and choose to cast their vote for either R or L. The winner, say L; then implements a policy. Finally the loser, say R; observes this policy outcome and chooses to …ght with probability p R .
Insert Figure 3 here Each party's expected payo¤ depends on (1) the distance between its ideal policy and the …nal policy outcome, and (2) the probability of …ghting. For example, assume that a party i wins the election and implements y i : Its opponent, (¡i) ; can then opt to …ght or not to …ght. If the opponent decides not to …ght, the game ends and R receives a payo¤ of ¡ jy i ¡ 1j = y i ¡ 1 , L receives a payo¤ of ¡ jy i + 1j = ¡y i ¡ 1 and M receives a payo¤ of ¡ jy i j. If (¡i) chooses to …ght, this decision leads to an outbreak of violence, and L receives ¡c L ; R receives ¡c R ; and M receives ¡c M .
The payo¤s show that under a peaceful democratic regime, each party is guaranteed a payo¤ of at least ¡2 and the median voter is guaranteed a payo¤ of at least ¡1:
To see why, note that if one party wins the election and implements its ideal point, its payo¤ is 0, its opponent's payo¤ is ¡2 and the median voter's payo¤ is ¡1: For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that (1) c L¸2 , (2) c L¸cR and that (3) c M¸1 : The …rst assumption captures situations in which one party (in this case L) has vested interests in peace because its payo¤ under a peaceful democratic regime is always higher than its payo¤ if there is violence. The second assumption shows that ARENA has greater military strength than the FMLN-MNR-DC and therefore loses less from an outbreak of violence than does the FMLN-MNR-DC. Finally, the third assumption reveals that M, like L, has vested interests in peace.
Insert Figure 4 here Before we present the electoral outcome, we need to provide a more precise de…n-ition of the concept of reservation policy. The policy outcome y R is the reservation policy of R, if and only if R …ghts if y R ¡ 1 · ¡c R and does not …ght otherwise.
Therefore if y R is the reservation policy, it must be case that 1¡y R = c R . In addition, since by assumption the cost of …ghting to L is greater than 2, L can never credibly threaten to …ght R and as a result, L 0 s reservation policy is at best ¡1. We assume that R knows the true location of its reservation policy y R ; but for L and M, y R is distributed in the interval [b; a] with cumulative distribution F and density f, where ¡1 · a · b · 1: As in section II, if c R · 2, R will …ght when y L 2 [y R ; a] and will not …ght otherwise: Consequently, the probability that the peace process breaks down if L is elected is given by
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
The problem facing ARENA and the FMLN-MNR-DC is to maximize their respective payo¤s subject to the constraints imposed by the political environment. Because we assume that players cannot commit themselves to future actions, parties and the median voter are required to behave in a sequentially rational manner. We will show that the FMLN-MNR-DC will tend to implement a policy that is moderate whereas ARENA will tend to implement a more extremist policy. However, in the case of uncertainty with respect to ARENA's military capabilities, a moderate policy only comes at the expense of a positive the probability of …ghting. The following describes the equilibrium post election scenarios when L is elected. PROPOSITION 1. If the FMLN-MNR-DC wins the election, then unless the cost of violence c L is extremely high, the policy outcome will be in the interval (a; b) and …ghting will occur with positive probability. On the other hand, if ARENA wins, the policy outcome is 1 and there will be no …ghting.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Unless the cost for …ghting is in…nitely high, …ghting can occur in equilibrium. In other words, unless the FMLN-MNR-DC has much to lose from …ghting, it will not make the policy compromise necessary to secure peace. We thus have two possible post-election scenarios: (1) either an extremist policy, 1 with no violence, or (2) a moderate policy with a risk of violence.
In El Salvador, the electorate had reasons to take threats of post-electoral violence seriously, even though at the time of the elections the FMLN-MNR-DC had already disarmed, and the armed forces were being reorganized. For instance, from 1992 to 1994 six top ranked leaders of FMLN-MNR-DC had been assassinated by right-wing death squads. Both parties, especially ARENA, had retained some of their ability to create civil disorder. As a result, voters could understandably believe if the FMLN-MNR-DC were to win, the policy outcome would be moderate but uncertain, and that the peace accords might be broken, leading to violence.
Voting behavior, like the bargaining outcome, will depend critically on the cost (c i ) associated with the breakdown of the peace agreement. When these costs are too high, the policy outcome will be 1 if ARENA wins and a; if the FMLN-MNR-DC wins.
As a result, the median voter, whose ideal point is 0 will prefer the FMLN-MNR-DC. If parties want to win, they will have an incentive to convince voters of the high probability of a costly con ‡ict in the event that they lose the elections. In the meantime, they will engage in bilateral secret negotiations to ensure that con ‡ict never occurs. This was exactly the strategy followed by ARENA during the political campaign. According to Vickers and Spence (1995) , both ARENA and the FMLN tried to secure compliance and implementation of the peace agreements through behindthe-scenes bargaining. In addition, during the last two months of the campaign, "the televisions airwaves were saturated by ads that featured gruesome pictures of wartime destruction warning that a vote for the FMLN would mean a return to the past" .
The evidence shows that, for most voters, the election of ARENA will increase both the e¤ectiveness of e¤orts to reduce violence in Salvadoran society and the likelihood that the peace accords will be implemented.
The most intriguing part of the present argument is that voters prefer the party most likely to jeopardize the peace process. They prefer the troublemaker. In our view, this voting behavior is not the result of direct intimidation but rather a rational decision to put "power where there is military force". Direct intimidation a¤ected the electoral outcome by helping ARENA signal to the voters that it (the ARENA) holds the key to country's political stability.
10
The overlapping dynamic between peace negotiations and elections played a significant role in the electoral outcome has been acknowledged by the FMLN-MNR-DC.
According to a strategist from this party, the leftist coalition was prevented from waging a more aggressive attack on ARENA because it did not want to undermine public support for the peace process (Stahler-Sholk). In addition, since the atmosphere of fear and violence was playing into the hands of ARENA, the FMLN-MNR-DC could only hope for a guarantee of protection for political rights. To achieve this goal, the FMLN-MNR-DC had to participate in the national election, concentrate its energies on bilateral negotiations with ARENA in order to demilitarize political life.
Overall, our analysis shows that the timing of the elections was not optimal and that it gave a structural advantage to ARENA. But while the implications of this …nding are that postponing elections may even out the relative advantage of the troublemaker, it is also the case that pushing the date far ahead may crush the peace process. Thus, the challenge is to …nd the balance between holding elections immediately and too late: soon enough so that the peace process may start but not so soon as to give one party undue advantage.
V. EQUILIBRIUM WITH ENTRY
In the previous sections, the decision to participate in the presidential election was not endogenous. Voters observed candidates' positions as well as their reservation payo¤s and then decided to cast their vote either for L or for R. In this section, we assume that before the elections take place, parties simultaneously choose whether to enter the race and whether or not to compete seriously in the election. We intend to show that, in the 1994 elections, the strategy of the FMLN-MNR-DC will be to enter in the race but not to compete seriously.
We assume that parties' utility functions depend on the level of campaign intensities e 2 f0; 1g where e = 0 corresponds to a low-intensity campaign and e = 1 corresponds to a high-intensity campaign. Campaign intensities a¤ect voters' perceptions about of parties' ideological positions as well as the cost of a potential post-election violence.
Since in our model there is no uncertainty about parties' policy positions we will then assume that campaign intensity only a¤ect voters' perception of cost of violence. That
Further, we will assume that only the ARENA can a¤ect the voter's perception about the cost of violence. That is c M = c M (e R ) : Finally, we assume that campaign intensity is costly to the parties and this cost,°, is decreasing in the amount of campaign funds allocated to parties by the state. The cost will be equal for both parties if they were allocated the same amount of money and will be lower for whoever has been allocated relatively more money.
The timeline of the new game is as follows: Before the election, parties decide whether or not to compete in the elections. Upon entering in the race, they choose the level of e¤ort from a set f0; 1g in the political campaign. After the political campaign, voters cast their votes, either for R or L. Then the winning party implements a policy, and the losing party decides whether or not to create political violence.
If one party does not enter in the race then the game ends with a status-quo. Each party then gets ¡C where C, de…ned the political cost of an unsettled con ‡ict is assumed to be greater than 2: If both parties choose to compete, then they simultaneously decide the level of campaign intensity and the play the game as in section III.
In the equilibrium for this game, party i makes a proposal of policy y L which is rejected with probability F (y L ). The median voter will select party i if, with this party in o¢ce, its utility will be higher. In anticipation of these policy and voting outcomes, parties will behave strategically, choosing whether or not to run and choosing e¤ort levels in the political campaign.
The following proposition describes the equilibrium at the pre-electoral stage. The result means the key to an ARENA's victory was not the unfair distribution of campaign funds per se but the fact enough resources were provided to the ARENA to play the fear card. Had the FMLN have access to the same amount of campaign funds as the ARENA, the FMLN would still have remained powerless in preventing the ARENA from playing the fear card and hence from winning the election.
The result provides an explanation for why the FMLN-MNR-DC often behaved as if it did when it conceded victory to ARENA before the elections even took place.
Just like most voters, the FMLN and its political allies might have come to the conclusion that its own electoral victory could create more political instability and violence. In fact, since the peace negotiations began in 1989, the FMLN and its allies feared that the military would never allow it to take power even if it were to win the elections. For that reason, the FMLN settled for a gradual demobilization of its forces in exchange for the disbanding of the National Guard, the National Police and the Treasury Police, and in exchange for partial control over the newly created police force. Despite the fact that the terms of this settlement have actually been implemented since 1992, and that the probability of resuming the war is very small, to some extent the specter of civil war was still haunting the electorate. In our view, this legacy clearly helps explain ARENA's 1994 victory.
Because of the uncertainty over the peace process, the electoral battle was pretty much lost for the FMLN-MNR-DC. Even a strong political campaign could not prevent the victory of ARENA. However, if this uncertainty were reduced, ARENA would have to moderate its policy platform in order to secure an electoral victory. As result, in order to have a moderate land reform policy be implemented, the FMLN-MNR-DC had to help decrease the level of uncertainty surrounding the electoral process. This was achieved mainly by concentrating on bilateral negotiations between parties to demilitarize the political process. In other words, the best strategy for the FMLN-MNR-DC was (1) to help legitimize the democratic process by participating in the election and (2) to help reduce political uncertainty by focusing on the demilitarization of the political process.
Political competition in post-civil war El Salvador arises from the overlapping dynamics of con ‡ict settlement and electoral competition. In such an environment, electoral uncertainty is compounded by uncertainty over the survival of the democratic process. In our previous work, on consensus democracy (Wantchekon 1995b), we showed that when all parties have everything to lose from a breakdown of the de-mocratic process, they will opt for power sharing or for a form of limited democracy.
This has been the case in South Africa and Chile, for example. In the case of El
Salvador it is important that we continue to reach an agreement whether we are in the majority or in the minority. The confrontation ended only months ago. Perhaps, once it is further behind us we can embark upon a path of more democratic norms. (Bland, 1994, p. 24, emphasis added) .
In a consensus democracy, limits on political competition come from the nature of the political institutions. The losing party expects to get a share of the executive power, and this makes the electoral process almost irrelevant in the allocation of power across parties. The losing party gets a level of political power that does not re ‡ect the level of its electoral support. In El Salvador, limits to political competition result not from an agreement between parties to form a government of National Unity as in South Africa, but instead from the FMLN and its allies down-playing the importance of the elections and trying to secure its place in the political arena. Thus, in new democracies, when either one party or all parties stand to lose substantially from a breakdown of the democratic process, political uncertainty may lead to limited democracy or low-intensity political competition.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As Stahler-Sholk (1995) has indicated, in evaluating the electoral climate it was impossible to measure the subjective dimension of fear or to evaluate its importance relative to apathy, clientelism, or other in ‡uences. While it would be di¢cult to measure fear in exact terms, it is nevertheless present. In this paper we consider one aspect of fear: fear of an interruption in the peace process. Looking at pre-electoral public opinion polls, we assess the relative importance of fear in shaping voters' preferences for parties. The perception by voters that a left-wing victory might lead to a new wave of political violence was compounded by ARENA's campaign ads that focused on images of destruction from the war. The fact that some death squads were still operating with impunity helped make these threats credible. The evidence clearly show that concerns about law and order and about what might happen if the left were to win the elections have been an important factor during the electoral process. In addition to the empirical evidence, we also construct a game theoretic model to explain the mechanism whereby the likelihood of a collapse of the democratic process could have led to the election of ARENA. We argue that, if the con ‡ict had been settled so that voters were convinced that the return to political violence was impossible, the left or the center could have won the 1994 elections.
In light of this analysis, we do not share the prevalent pessimism about the prospects of democratic consolidation in El Salvador. For example, has written that "the transition process, as represented by the peace accords and the elections of the 1992-1994 period, failed to instil a consolidated (or irreversible) democracy in El Salvador." However, we point out that when threats of violence have become less of an issue, the right will lose its decisive advantage vis-à-vis the left, and the political process will become more competitive. As mentioned earlier, from 1989 to 1993, the proportion of the electorate placing law and order at the top of their agenda has been declining. This number is expected to drop even further during the next elections. As a result, voters will switch their attention from concerns over the viability of the democratic process to issues such as education, poverty alleviation and unemployment. As a result, an electoral victory by a candidate from a party other than ARENA will become more likely. 
¡1:
Next, suppose 2 · c L < 1: An arbitrary type of R will respond to a policy in the interval (a; b] by …ghting with a strictly positive probability, F (y L ) : In anticipation of this response, party L will solve for y ¤ L such that
The …rst order condition for an interior solution is:
A su¢cient condition for the existence of an interior solution to (1) is that the following local second-order condition is satis…ed:
Next, we claim that (2) is satis…ed if and only if the hazard rate of the distribution,
is increasing in y L . To prove this claim, note that
is increasing in y L if and only if
We now rewrite (2) using (1): (3) in the right hand side of (2) yields,
is increasing in y L : Furthermore, if the R expects L to implement y ¤ L ; its best response is to …ght with probability
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose 2 · c L < 1 . In order to show how the cost parameters c L and c M a¤ect the median voter's voting behavior, let us …rst present her payo¤. According to
b c M is the value of c M such that M is indi¤erent between voting for R and voting for L. It is immediate that
We can now derive the median voter M L's payo¤ is
Finally, the payo¤ of the median voter is At the campaign stage, if the ARENA were to choose e R = 1 its payo¤ will be ¡°:
If it were to choose e R = 0 it will lose the election and its payo¤ will be ¡ jy s + 1j.
Thus the ARENA will choose e R = 1 so long as°< jy s + 1j : On the other hand, for°> 0, it is a dominant strategy for the FMLN-MNR-DC to choose e L = 0: This is because by choosing e L = 1 it gets ¡2 while by choosing 0 it gets ¡2 ¡°:
Finally at the entry stage, since the cost the unsettled con ‡ict C is higher than 2, it is a dominant strategy for both parties to enter in campaign.
in the 1984 presidential elections.
6. These concerns about the survival of the peace process were shared by the rural population. In 1989, 55 % of the rural electorate considered war and violence to be the single most important issue (UCA, May 1989) . In 1990, this percentage dropped to 52% and, in 1993 to 22%. (UCA, February 1990 and May 1993 .
See also Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías (1995) .
7. We should also mention that the economy comes second in all polls is in the 1980s and early 1990s. This might indicate that ARENA was more attractive than the FMLN because of its superior ability to manage the economy. However, it might be the case that those who care about improving the economy implicitly care about peace, since the former is nearly impossible without the latter. These events con…rm our conclusion that: (1) the threat of violence was the decisive factor in ARENA's 1994 victory and (2) after the implementation of the peace accords, as the threat declined the left and the center would adopt policy platforms opposed to ARENA.
